The final phase of prosecution's' case, which opened on April 27th, ended on May 7th. It was noteworthy mainly for the registration of a new indictment including charges of sexual violence. However, in a far more low-key way, the last few hours of the prosecution's case finally bestowed Alfred Musema's trial with a political and historical perspective that had hitherto been totally glossed over. After witness BB, whose public evidence was considerably shortened by a long in camera hearing, it was above all the sociologist and economist André Guichaoua who, at the eleventh hour, ultimately provided the Chamber with fresh information on the career of the accused before 1994. For three hours, the participants in the Musema trial climbed down from Muyira hill, as the debates suddenly grew in stature. The expert witness, André Guichaoua, a refined connaisseur of Rwanda, a country he has visited every year since 1979, deployed his knowledge as an economist and sociologist to contextualise the trial politically, economically and socially.

Expertise weighed up against legal efficiency ?

However, the Musema trial came within a fraction of missing out completely on this dimension of the case, for several reasons. Concerned that the trial was proceeding too slowly, President of the Chamber, Judge Lennart Aspegren, began by demanding that evidence given be directly relevant to the indictment against Musema. More generally, the judges in Chamber I, who have been soaking in Rwandan history for two years, had proved to be far less keen on large-scale political and historical presentations than they had been at the beginning of the trials. On this subject, Alfred Musema's defence had with natural and tactical meticulousness, very subtly managed to confine the debates solely to evidence supporting the crimes alleged by the prosecution. In order to do this, it had taken total advantage of both an OTP with no clear vision, or strategy worked out in this particularly ill-prepared case, and also a prosecution that had become resistant to expert witnesses. Indeed it was only one month ago that the OTP suddenly called on André Guichaoua to rescue it with support for its case. It was not until the last moment that Guichaoua knew for definite that he would be giving evidence in the trial. Firstly, in early April, the judges turned down the late prosecution motion to present this expert witness. Returning to the attack after this refusal, the prosecution finally managed to have the French researcher added to the list of prosecution witnesses. On April 28th, « in the interests of justice », the Chamber decided to hear André Guichaoua after all, but laid down limits on both time: half a day, and content: only relating to conspiracy to commit genocide, the personal role of the accused, his links with the government, and the Geneva Conventions. The preparation of the case was certainly open to criticism, but this move was also the result of a change of tack by the prosecution on the issue of expert witnesses, beginning in late 1997. It was no longer the moment for full-scale writing and comprehension of History, but for basic legal efficiency. However, by lifting the veil from concealed parts in the career of the accused, and the context giving rise to the indictment being used as a basis for the charges against him, the testimony given by Guichaoua, the only expert witness in the Musema case, turned out, in many respects, to be « in the interests of justice ».

The era of the leopards

« Whoever is protected by the leopard may draw water without fear ». In November 1997, in the evidence he gave in the Kayishema/Ruzindana case, the French academic had quoted this Rwandan proverb, which in his opinion, perfectly encapsulated the system set up after the July 5th 1973 coup d'état. This system was unique in that it had been « completely constructed around Juvénal Habyarimana ». Guichaoua then described the groups that formed around the presidential inner circle to take control of those sectors of the economy rich in resources to be shared out. He particular emphasised the activities related to the production of. and trade in tea and coffee, which brought in around half of the country's export earnings, and those linked to « international aid », which accounted for the other half. Control of the jobs thus created to manage the distribution of these export earnings was vitally important. Coming back to the proverb quoted a few minutes earlier, André Guichaoua explained that the « leopards » look after « placemen », who in turn support their benefactors. These financial resources thus lay at the very heart of a system of patronage which affected both strategic positions and those at the foot of the ladder, from the high-ranking civil servant down to the secretary.

Director-General at 26

Trial attorney Holo Makwaia, then questioned the witness about the accused and the position he occupied within this system. Implicitly outlining the limits he intended to place on his expert witness status, André Guichaoua pointed out that « making it personal makes the issue more sensitive ». With this made clear, he explained that from 1976 to 1984,
Alfred Musema, a trained agronomist, was Director-General in rural civil engineering and the land commission in the Ministry of Agriculture. « One of the largest departments in that ministry », he stipulated, « especially until 1985-1986 ».
At that time, international donors were channelling a good deal of their funding into projects relating to rural infrastructure.
The future Director of the Gisovu tea factory was thus at the head of a department handling large sums of money, rich in material resources and in regular contact with international partners.

The harder they fall

Guichaoua then said that in a system like that, the most important thing was not just to get the most senior posts, but to stay in them. This was borne out in the career path of the accused in the 1970s. For André Guichaoua, when Alfred Musema was appointed to the Ministry of Agriculture, he had certainly benefited from his wife's family background. She was the daughter of a deputy called Kayuku, a central figure of the 1959 « social revolution », who was murdered in 1962 by Tutsi guerrillas, then fighting the authorities of the First Rwandan republic. In 1976, fortune smiled on the young Musema. The happy period would last eight years. Then, in January 1984 (the witness said he was « absolutely certain » of the date), Atanase Ntezilyayo took charge of the Ministry of Agriculture. The new minister sacked two Director-Generals: Alfred Musema and Dismas Nsengiyaremye, future leader of the opposition and head of the government from April 1992.
To explain the dismissal of Alfred Musema, the witness referred to « jealousy » provoked by someone so young holding such a high-level job, but he also stressed the effects of the defendant's family ties, negative effects this time. André Guichaoua then spoke about the plot fomented against Juvénal Habyarimana in April 1980. Among the conspirators were two Hutus, Théoneste Lizinde and Alexis Kanyarengwe, who later became high-ranking officials in the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). A certain Ibanje, originally from Gisenyi préfecture, was also suspected of belonging to this group. He was arrested and imprisoned. Ibanje was not unknown to Alfred Musema. He had married Musema's sister-inlaw. Ibanje's downfall would thus entail that of his brother-in-law.

Appointment to the OCIR-Thé

There then began a difficult period for the young agronomist. He had great difficulty finding another post, and it was ultimately the Ministry of Industry that offered him a job in Gisenyi, in the Office des cultures industrielles du Rwanda-Thé (OCIR-Thé) (Rwanda Tea Company Office of Industrial Cultivation). Later in his testimony, André Guichaoua explained that in Rwanda the « semi-public companies » (like OCIR-Thé), and development plans played an essential role, as instruments for redistributing resources throughout the country. On their own level, they formed a system of patronage taking advantage of jobs and available money. The OCIR-Thé and the OCIR-Café were also labelled « strategic » because they guaranteed a considerable proportion of the country's export earnings.

« A factory director bought social harmony »

When he arrived at the Gisovu tea factory, Alfred Musema set up home in a préfecture described by André Guichaoua as, « cut off like a little enclave ». The post of director, certainly did not promise an outsider to the region, like Alfred Musema, an early return to Kigali and to the privileges to be found there. Kibuye is one of the poorest préfectures in the country.
Famines were not rare and the resources were « relatively impoverished »: minerals in Rutsiro and Gishyita, coffee in the lowlands, tea in Gisovu and in the south of the préfecture. In a context like this, development plans were of « crucial economic importance » as they provided the population with financial resources enabling them to pay certain costs (taxes, school and medical fees for example). Holo Makwaia then asked the witness to stipulate the impact that a tea factory might have in such a difficult economic environment. « In my opinion », began André Guichaoua, « a tea factory director had considerable power over the people under him, and also over the local authorities, for a very simple reason: if you provide people with the means to pay taxes, you give the commune the means to pay its civil servants (...) a factory director », he concluded, « bought social harmony where he was, and, in fact harmony in every area ».

Musema the politician ?

Twice, André Guichaoua used the limited time open to him to talk about the political activities of the defendant after multi-party politics was established in 1991. Musema was then a candidate for the post of préfet of Byumba, a préfecture in Northern Rwanda where he was originally from. His attempt failed after a face-off with another son of the region, the agronomist Augustin Bizimana, future Defence Minister in the interim government in April 1994. Entering a letter dated September 28th 1992 by the then Prime Minister, Dismas Nsengiyaremye, as an exhibit, the prosecution sought to further highlight the picture of Musema the politician. This was a dimension that had been totally neglected by the prosecution until André Guichaoua's hurriedly organised testimony. In his letter, Dismas Nsengiyaremye criticised the role played by a number of leading figures, among whom features Alfred Musema, in the antigovernment demonstrations in Kigali, on September 21st and 22nd 1992, involving people displaced from that préfecture. Anxious to contextualise these events, Guichaoua reminded that court that from 1990 onwards, fighting between the RPF and the Forces armées rwandaises (FAR), caused « very large numbers of displaced people » to leave the préfectures of Byumba and Ruhengeri to take the road south for the capital, where they settled. « Byumba préfecture did suffer », he observed, referring to « RPF extortion », which played « a huge role in the propaganda broadcast *by the regime+ concerning the attitude that the RPF might have if it took power ». Dismas Nsengiyaremye implicitly condemned the demonstrations' organisers for taking advantage of the distress of the displaced people, and demanded that an administrative enquiry be opened. He found it disgraceful that civil servants could lead « unauthorised demonstrations against the government which, moreover, was their employer ».

Infrastructure and pacification

The cross-examination, undertaken by Mr. Wladimiroff, was reduced to two questions addressed to the witness. On behalf of the defence, the Dutch lawyer started by saying that he was « very grateful » for the witnesses' testimony. « We think it will be very useful to us », he added. « Have you conducted research into Mr. Alfred Musema? » asked Wladimiroff. « I haven't really had the chance », answered André Guichaoua, emphasising « the very recent date » that he had been contacted by the OTP. « I haven't had much time to prepare anything », he complained again. He said he had used his own sources, and documents he could get hold of. Mr. Wladimiroff pushed home his advantage by stating that the witness was thus not in a position to say to what extent Alfred Musema fitted into the mould he had described to the court. « Personally, I can't add anything more to what I have said » maintained Guichaoua. « I'll just say, and I stress this, that I see it as vital to understand that it was impossible in one way or another, not to have participated in the decision-making chain if you were in a job like Alfred Musema's ». Judge Pillay then gave the witness a final chance to return to the subject of the factory in Gisovu. She wanted to know about the strategy adopted from April to July 1994 to ensure the factory's safety. A strategy that could have enabled the factory to exist like « a little State outside the conflict ». « Semi-public companies », explained André Guichaoua, « had to supply resources to the interim government ». So the production of tea and coffee was « monitored in an extraordinarily draconian way by central government ». The witness did not forget to add « the international aid », particularly vital to Kibuye, a préfecture in which Swiss government funding alone accounted for 90 million Swiss francs between 1965 et 1991. In this context, the role of a factory director in 1994 was above all, to maintain the infrastructure of production and exports. Apart from this initial mission was that of « pacification ». The maintenance of industrial capability or pacification: but what did « pacification » mean? In the final minute of André Guichoua's involvement in the trial, a vital dimension of the case had been broached. One that was essential to the debate around the Musema trial.

Difficult beginnings

During his testimony, André Guichaoua referred to the report made in 1986 by the Ministry of Industry on the way that the factory in Gisovu, then managed by Alfred Musema, was being run. It was stated that the director spent more time in Kigali than in the workplace, and was not involved enough in the tea factory's work. The dramatic increase in the factory's deficit over a year was also stressed, and Musema seems to have been threatened with administrative sanctions at the time.

« You had to choose which side you were on »

The prosecution lost no time in asking André Guichaoua to give the reasons that in his opinion explained the fact that the massacres in Kibuye préfecture had been carried out at such an intensity. Unlike the « powerful préfectures » like Kigali and Butare, Kibuye, « a peripheral préfecture » did not have the « more intimate » political relationships that people more used to negotiating were careful to maintain. These relationships were thus more brutal. So you had to be « very brave to make it known that you were in opposition if you had interests or property to defend ». Since there were no truly structured political parties at préfectoral level, confrontation centred on the adoption or rejection of an « anti-Tutsi line », a confrontation during which the extremist « Hutu power » faction had the edge. André Guichaoua also referred to the worries raised in the months leading up to April 6th by the plan to appoint a new Interior Minister, in compliance with the Arusha Agreements. Seth Sendashonga, an RPF man originally from Rwamatamu, in Kibuye préfecture was the appointee. The Rwandan Patriotic Front was actually planning to purge the local administration by getting rid of the people involved in the massacres that had already taken place there in 1992 and, more generally, those accused of small or large-scale embezzlement. In Guichaoua's view, the publication of the list of people threatened with destitution had entailed intense anti-RPF and anti-Tutsi mobilisation, in a region where the proportion of Tutsis was above the national average. It had also played a part in ensuring solidarity « between the senior officials of the préfecture and the masses » after April 6th. Returning to 1992, when « very serious » massacres had already been perpetrated, André Guichaoua explained that from that period onwards, « you had to choose which side you were on *in Kibuye préfecture+ ». Local officials thus had two years to think about their personal strategies and how they should behave. « From April 6th 1994, things were clear », he remarked, but the people concerned still had a few days ahead of them to make a decision. He then referred to several leading figures who had decided to « withdraw » from the whole situation. « The ones who remained involved knew exactly what tasks they would have to perform » .

« The lads' revenge »

The interim government appointed in the days after the attack on the presidential plane, and led by Jean Kambanda had one distinctive political feature. For the first time since July 5th 1973, ministers from the three préfectures in the north of the country (Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Byumba) were in a minority vis-à-vis those from the « South ». While it could count on having not more than one minister in each of the preceding governments, the préfecture of Kibuye inherited four not inconsiderably powerful ministries. The Ministry of the Interior was responsible for « pacification », the Ministry of Finances controlled the « nerve centre of the war », and lastly, the Ministry of Information performed the propaganda duties. This was a strategic trio to which the Ministry of Justice could be added. The moment for « the lads' revenge », as they called it in Kigali, or « the revenge of the pissed-off », those kept from power for a very long time, seemed to have come. In André Guichaoua's view, this exceptional Cabinet representation for Kibuye préfecture stemmed from the fact that it « played the part that many others did not want ». By giving centre stage to the « southern » ministers, Colonel Théoneste Bagosora sought to pass the buck for the massacres to them. In Guichaoua's opinion, those concerned were thus aware of the intention of the Director of the Defence Ministry cabinet, but until April 13-14th, they adopted a wait-and-see policy, as they were half-expecting foreign intervention. This did not materialise and the Ministers duly took on their tasks, although they did not forget the possibility of later leaving the country. The announcement of Operation Turquoise generated one last hope. The French intervention may have actually helped create a partition of the country into two zones, one controlled by the RPF and one by the interim government. When this hope was dashed, the ministers then prosecuted their strategy « consisting of concealing their actions in order to negotiate » with States ready to deal with them. To this end, said the witness, they all remembered to « provide diaries » that could give them alibis.