From September 30 to October 2, the first trial chamber heard the testimony of Captain Luc Lemaire, chief of the Belgian « Blue Helmets » occupying the Official Technical School (OTS) in Kigali until April 11, 1994. After the UN soldiers left, about 2,000 individuals who had sought refuge there were attacked and massacred. When he arrives in Rwanda on March 13, 1994, Luc Lemaire was a lieutenant. He was heading a company of Belgian « Blue Helmets » which is based at the Official Technical School (OTS), in the area of Kicukiro, in Kigali. This is how he describes the situation at his arrival: « The situation is pretty bad. On February 23 there were riots and assassinations. There were 23 deaths in my municipality. (...) During the presentation which was given to me before my departure, the police force was presented as being trustworthy and neutral. On March 16 or 17, a security meeting took place at the church located 300 meters away from the OTS, where the bourgmestre, a priest and a commander-in-chief of the police force were present. I then realized that the police force was not neutral at all. The bourgmestre and the priest, being very courageous, asked that measures be taken against those who perpetrated the massacres in February. They say that the people are known and that it is easy to arrest them. The commander-in-chief answers that the proofs are largely insufficient and that if there was a trial, they would be released ».

The Threat of the Interahamwes Militias

The captain looks at his notes taken at the time, and talks about incidents that occurred at control check points in the last week of March, and about other punctual events which indicate the aggressiveness of the police officers or their own unwillingness to accomplish their duty to exercise control. « The Belgian soldier always had to ask that the control be exercised ». The officer meets with Father Peters. For him, the Presidentís will to support the transitional government is an illusion. He tells that the only dangerous points in the municipality are all centered around meeting points of the MRND or of the CDR, having the only flags allowed to fly in the municipality. The priest and the burgomaster clearly identify « the enemies » : the Interahamwes and Impuzamugambi militias. Captain Lemaire tells that, « Every evening, the Interahamwes come and threaten the refugees of the church of the parish *of the OTS+ ». On April 4, a refugee of this church gives him more detailed information on the composition of the Interahamwes groups. He states that a meeting between the Interahamwes and a commander-in-chief of the police force took place in Kacyiru, where it was said that « in the following days, the Tutsis will be massacred », that they « will kill the biggest number of Tutsis from Katanga ». The informant further adds that the manner in which the arms will be distributed and the plan on how to attack the parish was established. During the night of April 6 to 7, after the attack of the presidential plane, « the town remains calm ». Between 5 and 6 a.m., within half an hour, there was a state of « explosion and blockage ». The company is given the order to avoid contacts and to stay confined. It is also at dawn that the escort of the prime minister is caught under fire. At about 8:00 a.m., three Blue Helmets responsible for the protection of the attorney Ngango signal that they are being threatened by about 30 armed men, having their arms pointed towards them from a distance of 3 or 4 meters. The message of the Rwandan soldiers is clear: they want the Ngango family; if the Belgian soldiers oppose themselves to it, they will also be killed. They are given the order to give up. From these hours on, « the sound of the burst of gunfire and explosion is nearly uninterrupted ».

Two Thousand Refugees

Since dawn of April 7, the people sought protection in the school. Initially, the United Nation Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) orders not to let them in. « Yes, but we are at the Sailesien's place and it is they who are receiving them », answers the Captain. « If it is the way it is, then accept them » answers the commander in chief. Luc Lemaire explains that « The OTS was like a fortified castle to which the peasants came seeking refuge ». « All the municipality is represented there. The bourgmestre arrived very rapidly as well as all the professorial body. Ordinary people and refugees from the parish were also there ». Shooting and combat positions are organized. « We thought we were reliving February, a crisis with murders », tells the captain. At the end of the stay of the Belgians, the number of individuals refugeed at the OTS will be estimated at around 2,000. In a video presented to the public which was taken by the second in command on April 9, there are about 1,000 individuals. The company does not have the necessary equipment for treating injured individuals. The supply of water and food is very bad. The burgomaster is aware of the existence of a stock of rice in the neighborhoods. Colonel Rusatira, officer of the FAR and head of the school of the non-commissioned officers, who will make several trips to the OTS during these days will accept to be in charge of these supplies. « Every day, the Interahamwes come closer to the school and become more threatening ».
-« How do you recognize an Interahamwe ? asks the defense attorney.
- I have never seen an Interahamwe uniform. However, all the information that I received from different sources considered the Interahamwes to be a threat. I cannot personally recognize an Interahamwe. But I knew that the area was encircled by police officers and the Interahamwes. They were the only ones that were allowed to move around. When I see a vehicle with armed individuals freely circulating between two road blocks, I know that they are Interahamwes.

»We Prefer to be Killed by a Burst of Your Fire Arms«

Very quickly the Belgian officer knows that he might have to leave the OTS with his men. Since he wants the refugees to know this, he gathers the people on April 9 and advises them to leave in small groups during the night, and to head towards the southern countryside. The reaction of the crowd is »rapid and violent. They realize that they may lose their lifesaving protection« . For example, one individual said: »We prefer to be killed by a burst of your gunfire rather than the machetes of the Interahamwes« . The captain adds: ìThere are not only endangered people at the OTS. There are also those who are only looking for security. There are mainly Tutsis, also threatened Hutus and other Hutus. (...) For me, on the 9th it is clear that we have to move if there are no reinforcements. When we learned that the Belgians came for 48 hours, we knew that the Whites would be evacuated by us. Thus, I arrange the departure to look like a withdrawal. On the morning of the 11th, we know that the UNAMIR will organize the evacuation. The only logical solution is to go back to the airport. Towards the end of the movement, [the refugees] realize that we are leaving the school. After my second in command left, the people held onto the jeeps, and the last cars were obliged to shoot in the air to be able to leave ». He is asked whether there had been any discussion as to whether the refugees should be evacuated. Every time that he asked this question to his superiors, there was either no response or a response according to which there were other missions that had priority. « The column could have been 1 kilometer long. We did not have the necessary means. The second possibility: make several trips to a safe point: either the airport, but what happens then after our departure ? Or towards the Amahoro stadium, but we do not have the means for that ». On April 11 at around 12:30 the Blue Helmets leave the OTS. At that time, according to the captain, « the area was very calm ». On April 20, Captain Lemaire definitively leaves Rwanda.

« I Did Not Want to See »

Luc Lemaire learned two years later what happened to the people who were at the OTS. He admits « I never imagined that such a massacre would take place ». Why did he never want to know ?
« I did not want to see. I thought of evacuating the refugees, but there was no feasible solution. Every time that we could save people with our fire extinguisher and our means, we did it ». For him, the whole zone was a « building on fire: we could not extinguish it with our fire extinguisher ». Explaining in details the powerlessness of the company, which was trapped by the total lack of organization of the UNAMIR and the decisions of the international community, the captain states, without hiding his bitterness, that he « did not have the choice ». The man has a clear and transparent mind. However, he is not unharmed. « Last night I slept very badly because I relived what happened, and the decision that I took».

The UNAMIR, the UN, the Belgian Government,
and France Under Criticism

Nobody was spared. With a calm, firm, and frank tone of voice, Captain Lemaire instructed the fictive trial of the International Armed Forces that were present in Rwanda in April 1994. A judgment without trial and without appeal.

« I know that this is not the trial of the UNAMIR or of the UN. But I want to have the opportunity to say what I lived through at the level of the UN and the Belgian government. I would like to have it admitted once and for all that the soldiers were not trusted by the U.N. *In Rwanda+, the case was treated offhand ». Interrogated by Ubutabera at the end of his testimony before the ICTR, Captain Lemaire talked about the motivations of his testimony before the international court of justice. The man has a clear mind and he is still concerned about choosing the best words after 2 1/2 days of dense and precise interrogatories. These were long hours during which the 42 year old officer, with round and deep eyes, continuously tried to explain and express his anger, if not his disgust, which these days of April 1994, under the UN banner, left him and his men. Thus, in the background of his testimony, all the international forces present in Rwanda in April 1994 were in the hot seat. The Belgian officer first detailed the insufficiencies of the military equipment that was made available to him: he had simple individual automatic arms with few munitions, and armored vehicles without cannons or munitions ìwhich were refused for four months by Belgium« . Then he talked about the limits of and the obstructions to their mandates: »the Rwandans that were close to the party of the President rendered everything « unfeasible ». Thus there were « numerous problems at the check points that were caused by people or officers close to the regime. (...) We knew that there were stocks of arms in Kigali, but searches were always prohibited ». The organization of the forces of the UNAMIR was criticised. His company is the only one re-grouping about a hundred people. Captain Lemaire further tells that the rest of the battalion is ìdangerously scattered in little groups of 4 to 30 individuals. This is important to understand the decisions that were taken later to gather the soldiers. This scattering will have heavy consequences in events that occurred later« .On April 7 at dawn, whereas the ten »mortars« are made prisoner, a group of 20 men is trapped between two road blocks on the road to the airport and a little bit later in front of the Amahoro stadium, where the Bangladeshi contingent had withdrawn. The 20 »Blue Helmets« are encircled by about 300 individuals among which were police officers and commanders. For two hours, they tried to have the Bangladeshis open the doors. They are the only ones having armored vehicles.
After two hours, the tension doubles and a car from the UNAMIR is turned over and pushed into the trench. The group frees itself by shooting and by climbing over the fence of the stadium. »It is important to know that the only armored company of the UNAMIR was not able to help the soldiers« , even though they were right in front of them. The opinion of the captain on the Bangladeshi contingent is retained only for the form: »a problem of means, training, not adapted to this type of mission« .
- Was the mission badly organized ? asks Judge Aspegren.
- Mockingly, the Captain responds that this is a euphemism. There is a serious problem at the UN regarding the lack of interaction between the people taking the decisions and the people that are on the terrain. The ten »mortars« died for no reason since the mission was not realized. (...) We have obtained 2,500 individuals instead of 5,000, and these include troops that were not ready for this type of situation and which were under-equipped. The threat has been underestimated. The concept of maintaining peace was totally insufficient. There were clear messages and until April 20, no changes were made.
- Do you think that General Dallaire was aware of this ?
- I have the impression that the preparation for genocide was not undertaken appropriately.
In a region in which there is a great risk of genocide, it is incredible to let soldiers go to
town without arms to go dancing ».

A Cynical Calculation by the Belgians

The Belgian government was not spared either. Between April 7 and April 9, according to Captain Lemaire, Belgium tries to obtain a change of the rules of action of the UNAMIR. This is the condition for the maintenance of their presence.
« The day of April 7 will always stay in our memory. We had the possibility to save these people, if Belgium had wished to do so. We have been the direct victims of the attempt of the Belgian politicians to save money. If the brigade had intervened, if Belgium had had the courage to pass over the New York decisions, we would have had the chance to do something good in Rwanda. We have not been listened to regarding our means. We had asked for 800 men. However we were 350. For four months we have asked for munitions. However, we have never received them.
Everyone was aware of the OTS. Everyone had given up hope for these refugees. (...) I think that there was a cynical calculation from the part of our politicians. By providing 350 soldiers, Belgium spent a minimum amount of men and money. With a little bit of chance, Belgium would have helped to bring back peace and could have hoped for bilateral agreements after Arusha. Since then, many soldiers have a profound disgust ».It is then the turn of Judge Pillay to try to know whether the Belgian government and the United Nations were in a position to prevent the massacres. In a calm and relentless manner, the captain responds « Belgium went through the trouble of moving troops for one billion *Belgian francs+. This money could have been made available to the United Nations if the rules of action had been modified. During the whole mission, we had hoped for such a change. The Belgians had enough information that showed the preparation of the genocide. When Belgium found out what was happening, Belgium should have had the courage to intervene without waiting for the UN ».
The anger of Captain Lemaire also targets the French Armed Forces. During the missions in the town, particularly during the evacuation of the expatriated people, the captain remembers the « hurrahs » heard when the French were passing by. On the contrary, the Belgians are shown a gesture of a finger cutting a throat. When they came to the OTS to take the expatriated, the French soldiers indicated that they would only take the French - they were three - and the Italians. There are then 147 expatriated at the OTS. Lemaire refuses. The French are forced to take everyone. When, on the morning of the 11th, the French take the expatriated, they say that they are going to the airport. In fact, they lead them to the French school. On the 12th, after having left the OTS, the captain arrives at the French school and participates in the evacuation. He explained: « I realized then that the French left all the Africans with us because they did not want any problem with the FAR at the road blocks ». The video-taped document shown to the public shows the clear state of mind of these Belgian « Blue Helmets » which were powerless and disgusted. On April 10, the second in command films the shooting posts set up by the company. At the entrance of the OTS, the « Blue Helmets » installed a machine-gun « Point 50 ». In his commentary, he indicates that the use of this arm requires the preliminary authorization of the Secretary General of the UN. He adds: « might as well say that we don't give a damn about Mr. Boutros ». The video camera also films, elsewhere, the report book (?). However, the camera zooms only on 2 issues: the message which confirms the assassination of the 10 « mortars » and another one which says: « New York does not accept a change in the rules of action ».