Dutch troops in Iraq ignored agreements between The Hague and London aimed at presenting their forces as non-occupying coalition partners and peacekeepers, according to Dutch historian Arthur ten Cate.

Mr Ten Cate says it would be going too far to call it mutiny, but rather there was a “pragmatic attitude” on the part of the Dutch high command in Iraq, according to a report in daily De Pers.

The then cabinet, led by Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, didn’t want the Dutch marines to cooperate work on setting up a new provincial government, the Coalition Provisional Authority, because the UN resolution of 22 May 2003 stated that it the job of the United Kingdom and the United States to put a new government in place. However, in practice, after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party a provincial authority was desperately needed in al-Muthanna to prevent the province from descending into chaos. So in collaboration with a senior political advisor, Dutch forces commander Dick Swijgman went against instructions from The Hague to work on putting the new administration in place.

Crackdown
Then defence minister Henk Kamp also opposed an independent Dutch approach to crime, including smuggling, looting and car theft, because this was also seen as part of the responsibilities of an occupying force. The Dutch commander nevertheless ordered a crackdown on arms trafficking in the provincial capital as-Samawah to prevent opponents such as Shi'ite insurgent leader Muqtada al Sadr from buying weapons there.

Historian Arthur ten Cate made his remarks in a speech to the 36th congress of the International Commission of Military History in Amsterdam, in the run up to the launch of his book on the Dutch mission in Iraq between 2003 and 2005, co-authored with fellow historian Thijs Brocades. Mr Ten Cate concludes that the Dutch government’s assessment of the situation in Iraq was at odds with the reality of the battlefield.

Illusion
The two historians also shatter the illusion of the much-vaunted ‘Dutch Approach’, which aimed to promote security by sending out foot patrols without helmets to build relations with the local population. According to Mr Ten Cate, the reality was that the Dutch forces were fortunate in that local tribal leaders wanted peace. Furthermore, there was a low rate of unemployment in the province, which made it difficult for the insurgents to recruit new members. When the British tried the so-called Dutch Approach in southern Iraq, they failed because the circumstances were much more difficult.

However, Mr Ten Cate says it would be wrong to say the Dutch force stationed in al-Muthanna province until March 2005 didn’t have its own approach, aimed at winning over the population. He says he would prefer to call it a “Dutch Touch”, a sort of “anti-guerrilla warfare light”. He added that pockets filled with US dollars were also very useful in supporting the process.